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Abstract: 
 
We examine CEO compensation, CEO retention policies, and M&A decisions in firms 
where founders serve as a director with a non-founder CEO (founder-director firms). We 
find that founder-director firms offer a different mix of incentives to their CEOs than 
other firms. Pay for performance sensitivity for non-founder CEOs in founder-director 
firms is higher and the level of pay is lower than that of other CEOs. CEO turnover 
sensitivity to firm performance is also significantly higher in founder-director firms 
compared to non-founder firms. Overall, the evidence suggests that boards with founder-
directors provide more high powered incentives in the form of pay and retention policies 
than the average U.S. board. Stock returns around M&A announcements and board 
attendance are also higher in founder-director firms compared to non-founder firms.  
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1. Introduction 
We examine corporate governance outcomes when the founder of a company 
serves as a director on its board by studying three corporate decisions - CEO 
compensation, CEO turnover, and mergers and acquisitions (M&A).  Almost twenty-five 
percent of large U.S. companies have their founders actively associated with the company 
either as the CEO (13%) or as a member of the board of directors (12%). We label the 
former group founder-CEO firms and the latter group founder-director firms. Our focus 
in this paper is on the role played by founders as directors and not as executives and thus 
on founder-director companies.1
Prior research posits that founders add value through a combination of specialized 
knowledge, concentrated and long term ownership, and non-pecuniary (e.g., reputational 
and emotional) ties to the firm (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; James, 1999). The greater 
financial and non-financial ties provide founders with both the ability and the incentives 
to provide better monitoring when they serve as directors. Founder-directors' greater firm 
specific experience reduces information problems between the board and managers that 
may prevent effective oversight (Jensen, 1993). Founder-director companies are therefore 
likely to have fewer agency problems and be better governed than non-founder 
companies. Perhaps for this reason, prior studies document that family firms have a 
higher valuation when founders are actively involved in managing the firm (Andersen 
 Note that our definition of founder-director firms is 
mutually exclusive from founder-CEO firms, even though CEOs typically serve on the 
board of the company. CEOs in founder-director companies are successor CEOs who are 
not the founder or members of the founder's family. 
                                                 
1 Prior papers (e.g., Fahlenbrach, 2009; Adams et al., 2009) have examined the role of founder-CEOs in 
firm performance and corporate decisions. 
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and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). Villalonga and Amit (2006, page 404) 
posits that compared to the value of founders as CEO “founders’ skills are almost as 
valuable when they bring them to the firm through a position as Chairman with a hired 
CEO in place.” This research motivates our study on the governance role of founders 
when they become directors of companies they founded.  
Our sample consists of 11,686 firm-years of U.S companies between 1996 and 
2004 that are covered by Compustat’s Execucomp database and Investor Responsibility 
Research Center’s Directors dataset. Similar to prior studies that document a valuation 
premium in family firms (e.g., Andersen and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006), we 
find that founder-director firms exhibit a valuation premium as measured by Tobin’s Q.  
We find that companies with founder-directors behave differently for all of the 
three decisions that we examine. First, CEOs in founder-director companies have higher 
pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS) than CEOs in non-founder firms. For non-founder 
firms, the average CEO's annual total compensation including the change in value of 
stock and option holdings increases by about $5.20 for a $1,000 increase in the market 
value of the firm. For firms with a founder-director the additional PPS is $2.24. In 
addition, after controlling for other economic determinants of pay level, CEOs of 
founder-director firms receive lower pay than CEOs in non-founder firms. We interpret 
this as lower excess pay due to better governance in these firms (Core et al., 1999).  In 
terms of economic magnitude, CEOs of founder-director firms, on average, receive 
$329,000 less than CEOs of non-founder firms in annual compensation after controlling 
for other economic determinants of pay. 
 3 
Second, CEOs in founder-director firms are more likely than those in non-founder 
firms to be replaced for poor performance. A decline in performance from the top to 
bottom decile in performance increases the likelihood of a forced CEO turnover by 
almost 8.3% more in founder-director firms compared to non-founder firms. Lastly, we 
find that the three-day M&A announcement return is 1.29 % higher for founder-director 
firms than other firms.  
In addition to examining outcomes related to monitoring and advisory roles of the 
board, we corroborate our findings using a measure of board effort - director attendance 
at board meetings (Cai et al., 2009). We find that non-founder directors have a better 
attendance record in founder-director firms than directors in other firms. This could be 
because the presence of founder-directors results in better functioning boards or because 
founder-directors are able to pick more diligent directors for their companies.  
Our paper contributes to two major research areas. First, we contribute to the 
literature on the role of founders in firms. Our results suggest that the founder's role 
extends to more effective board level monitoring and not just to superior executive 
performance as documented in prior research. The higher PPS, lower excess 
compensation, and higher turnover-performance sensitivity are uniquely associated with 
founder-directors. They are not observed when other directors with firm specific 
experience (e.g., prior CEOs) serve on the board even when these prior CEOs have high 
levels of equity ownership in the company. This suggests that the effect reflects more 
than the founder’s expertise and equity incentives to monitor but is likely a combination 
of these factors and the founder’s non-pecuniary attachment in the form of reputational 
and emotional investment in the firm. 
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Our paper complements research cited earlier on family firms that finds that 
active founders are associated with higher firm value by examining a set of micro-
mechanisms that could drive the association. The evidence of better board decisions that 
we document makes it more likely that founders have a positive causal effect on firm 
value and less likely that the association with value documented in prior papers is driven 
by omitted factors. 
Second, our paper adds to research on the role of the board of directors in firm 
outcomes. To the extent that founder-directors are more willing and able to monitor 
managers, governance practices in founder-directors firms are closer to first-best.2
We recognize that we lack a clean instrument to identify the causal effect of 
founder-directors on firm policy. We control for differences between founder-director 
and other firms using a large number of observable firm characteristics –firm age, firm 
size, industry, diversification, accounting and stock return performance, leverage, R&D 
and capital expenditure intensity, beta, accounting and stock return volatility, governance 
features like board size, G-index, board independence, presence of block holders on the 
board, institutional holdings, board equity ownership, and Delaware incorporation. We 
also include a number of CEO characteristics as control variables - CEO age, CEO 
tenure, equity ownership by the CEO, proxies for CEO talent and CEO power, and 
 Our 
results therefore suggest that compared with the first-best scenarios, the majority of firms 
(i.e., non founder-director firms) over-compensate managers, provide their CEOs with 
lower incentive-based pay, and do not replace CEOs in a timely manner when faced with 
poor performance. 
                                                 
2 Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that managerial control is much simplified in the presence of one or a 
few concentrated residual claimants with sufficient firm specific knowledge who can ratify and monitor 
important decisions and set rewards. Founder-directors are a good example of such a residual claimant. 
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whether the CEO is an internal or external hire. Our results hold after the inclusion of all 
these controls and present a coherent picture of the structure of CEO incentives in a 
founder-director company.  In robustness tests, we also confirm our results using matched 
sample tests. Like with all empirical studies lacking clean instruments, we caution against 
drawing causal inferences from our findings. We cannot rule out the possibility that the 
associations between the presence of a founder-director and the corporate governance 
outcomes are due to other unobserved differences in firm or CEO characteristics. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and 
sample. Section 3 presents the empirical evidence, Section 4 presents sensitivity tests and 
additional analyses, and Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Sample and variable definitions 
Our sample of 11,686 companies comprises the intersection of the Investor 
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) directors’ database and the Execucomp database 
for the years 1996-2004. We identify founders from biographies of directors in the proxy 
statement and supplement this using the Forbes 800 list, Business Week (2003) and the 
Board Analyst database. We also follow Milbourn (2003) and identify the CEO at the 
founding of the firm as the founder.3
Following Milbourn (2003), we identify the CEO as the person who was in office 
for at least six months of that fiscal year in the years when there is CEO turnover. CEO 
turnovers are classified as forced or normal using the same method as Parrino (1997). All 
CEO departures where press reports indicate that the CEO was fired, forced out, or left 
  
                                                 
3 Founding year data are from the Field-Ritter dataset as used in Field and Karpoff (2002) and Loughran 
and Ritter (2004) supplemented with incorporation dates collected from Hoovers and Mergent databases. 
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due to performance problems, policy or other unspecified differences with the board are 
classified as forced.  Departures are recorded as normal if the CEO was aged 60 and 
above, if the press reports give the reason for departure as death, poor health, acceptance 
of another position (including board chairmanship), part of a succession plan, due to 
previously undisclosed personal or business reasons unrelated to the firm’s activities, or 
if the retirement is announced at least 6 months before the departure date. This 
classification is necessary since boards rarely explicitly dismiss CEOs from their jobs. 
CEO turnover caused by mergers and spin-offs are excluded from our turnover analysis.       
We use the SDC Platinum database to identify all completed acquisitions by 
sample firms of private, public, and subsidiary targets from January 1992 to December 
2005. Following Moeller et al. (2004) we select M&A deals that satisfy the following 
criteria: (1) the target firm is a U.S. firm; (2) the deal value is at least $1million; (3) the 
percentage stake the acquirer seeks in the deal is at least 50%; and (4) the deal is 
completed. Firm specific accounting data are from Compustat and stock return data are 
from CRSP.  
 
2.1 Variable description and descriptive statistics 
Table 1 Panel A presents the summary statistics on the key variables used in the 
study. The variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. In our sample, the founders 
serve as directors with non-founder CEOs (FDIR = 1) in roughly 12 percent of the firm-
years and in around 13 percent of firm years as the CEO (FCEO = 1). Eighteen percent of 
the firm year observations have a former non-founder CEO (PAST_CEO = 1) on the 
board. Like founders, past CEOs have greater firm specific knowledge which can make 
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them more effective in monitoring managers than other directors. We also identify past 
non-founder CEOs with a large equity stake (HI_PASTCEO_HOLD) using a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 when the equity stake of the past CEO is larger than the 
median equity holding of founder-directors in the sample and zero otherwise. The 
information advantage of the past CEOs combined with a large equity stake provides 
these directors with the knowledge and financial incentive to monitor managers. We use 
the non-founder past CEO measures to benchmark the performance of founder-directors. 
Only about 1 percent of our sample firm-year observations have a founder descendant as 
the CEO, which is measured by FAM_CEO, an indicator variable coded as 1 if the non-
founder CEO has the same last name as the founder.4
The dependent variables used in the study capture features of CEO compensation, 
CEO turnover, and M&A decisions. We use two measures of CEO compensation. Annual 
compensation (ACOMP) is the sum of total annual compensation, including stock options 
granted. Total compensation (TCOMP) is measured as the sum of the following three 
components: (i) cash compensation, which is the sum of salary, bonus, and other annual 
cash payouts over the year; (ii) the Black–Scholes value of options granted and the 
market value of restricted stock granted during the year and other long-term incentive 
payouts; and (iii) the change over the year in the market value of equity and options held 
by the CEO at the beginning of the year. We follow Core and Guay (2002a) in 
calculating the sensitivity of option portfolio values to stock prices focusing on equity 
and options held at the beginning of the year to avoid confounding issues related to 
equity sales and option exercises during the year. The mean (median) ACOMP is $4.7 
  
                                                 
4 We recognize that this methodology misses children and siblings of the founder who may use a different 
last name but adopt this method for ease of implementation.  
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million ($2.5 million) and mean (median) TCOMP is $15.64 million ($4.03 million). We 
observe 1,253 CEO changes, 330 of which we classify as forced and the remaining 923 
as normal turnovers.  The mean (median) three-day stock returns around the M&A 
announcement dates (ARET) is 0.24% (0.14%) and statistically indistinguishable from 
zero. 
Prior studies find that founder firms have different characteristics compared with 
other firms.5
We also include several CEO characteristics as control variables. These are CEO 
age (CEO_AGE);  number of years since appointed CEO (CEO_TENURE); CEO equity 
ownership (CEO_OWN); CEO reputation as measured by the number of press mentions 
(MEDIA_MENTIONS) of the CEO in a given year (see  Milbourn, 2003), and by the 
number of other boards that the CEO serves on (OUTSIDE_BD) (see Srinivasan, 2005 
and Fich and Shivdasani, 2007); CEO power (CENTRALITY) measured as the ratio of 
CEO pay to that of the top 5 executives of the firm (see Bebchuk et al., 2009); whether 
the CEO was promoted internally or was hired from outside (INSIDE_HIRE), (see 
Parrino, 1997 and Huson et al., 2004).   
 We therefore include the following firm characteristics in the multivariate 
analysis to control for possible firm-specific differences between founder-director and 
other firms: firm size (MVE), R&D intensity (RND), leverage (LEV), firm age 
(FIRM_AGE), extent of firm diversification (DIVERSIFY), beta (BETA), intensity of 
capital expenditure (CAPX), extent of option based pay (OPTINT), firm performance 
measured by stock returns (RET) and accounting return on assets (ROA), return volatility 
(RET_VOL), and ROA volatility (STD_ROA). 
                                                 
5 See, for instance, Adams, Almedia and Ferreira (2009), Anderson and Reeb (2003), Anderson, Mansi and 
Reeb (2003), Anderson and Reeb (2004), Fahlenbrach (2009), Palia and Ravid (2002), Palia, Ravid and 
Wang (2007), Perez-Gonzalez (2006), Villalonga and Amit (2006), and Villalonga and Amit (2009). 
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Finally, we include controls for several board characteristics and other 
governance related variables. BD_INDP captures the percentage of independent board 
members; BD_SIZE is the number of directors on the board; INST_HOLD measures the 
extent of institutional ownership; DIR_HOLD is the average equity ownership by the 
board of directors; and IND_DIR_BLK identifies block holders among non executive 
directors on the board (who are not founders). The variable DELAWARE shows that 56% 
of our sample firms are incorporated in Delaware. G-INDEX is the governance index 
from Gompers et al. (2003). 
In Table 1 Panel B, we present the descriptive statistics and test results of the 
differences in the means of the variables by founder status (i.e., non-founder, founder-
director, and founder-CEO firms). The statistical tests use standard errors clustered at the 
firm level. Consistent with a founder valuation premium, the mean market-to-book ratios 
of founder-director firms (2.61) and founder-CEO firms (2.38) are higher than for non-
founder firms (1.83). Total compensation (TCOMP) is higher for founder-CEOs ($29.39 
million) than for CEOs in founder-director firms ($20.51 million) and CEOs of non-
founder firms ($12.54 million) but the annual flow compensation (ACOMP) is similar 
across the three groups. While higher total compensation for founder-CEOs is consistent 
with their higher equity ownership in the firms they founded, higher TCOMP for CEOs 
of founder-director firms compared to other CEOs suggests systematic differences in 
compensation policy between such firms. The mean percentage of forced CEO turnover 
(TNV) is 2.69% for non-founder firms, 5.88% for founder-director firms, and 2.02% for 
founder-CEO firms. The difference in CEO turnover rates between founder-director firms 
and other firms is statistically significant and suggests differences in CEO retention 
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policies. The only statistically significant difference in the M&A announcement returns 
(ARET) is between founder-CEO firms (0.81%) and non-founder firms (0.12%). These 
univariate results suggest that CEO compensation and CEO turnover are different in 
founder-director firms than in other firms. 
Compared to non-founder firms, founder-director firms are more R&D intensive, 
less leveraged, younger, more volatile, and more diversified. They have similar market 
capitalization, higher betas, weaker CEO power as measured by centrality, CEOs serving 
on fewer boards, older and longer serving CEOs, smaller board size, lower board 
independence, better shareholder rights protection (G-index), and greater board 
shareholding.  
Compared to founder-CEO firms, founder-director firms are larger in terms of 
market capitalization, less leveraged, and older. They have older CEOs, CEOs with 
shorter tenure, larger and less independent boards, lower institutional holdings, and 
weaker shareholder rights protection. We consider these differences between categories 
as potential causes of spurious correlation between founder-director status and our 
outcome measures. Therefore we control for all these variables in our multivariate 
regressions.6
Prior studies have documented a valuation premium for family firms where 
founders are still active (e.g., Andersen and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). We 
  
 
3 Multivariate results 
3.1 Founder-directors and value premium. 
                                                 
6 Note that the number of observations in the various multivariate tests is lower than those in the overall 
sample and vary across the tests due to data availability constraints on the different variables. 
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use the founder valuation premium finding to motivate that the founder can play a 
valuable role as a director. We examine the association between founder-director and 
firm value using the following model for firm j and year t: 
Qjt = β0 + β1FDIRjt + γ Control Variablesjt +  industry dummiesj + year dummiest 
+  errorjt.              (1) 
 The dependent variable is the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value 
of assets - a proxy for Tobin’s Q.  Year and industry fixed effects are included in all the 
regressions. All t-statistics reported in this and later tables are based on standard errors 
clustered at the firm level to account for within-firm correlations. 
The results in Table 2 suggest that the presence of a founder-director is associated 
with higher value - the coefficient on FDIR is 0.30 (t-statistic = 3.34), implying that 
Tobin's Q of founder-director firms is 0.30 higher than that of non-founder firms. This 
magnitude is economically significant compared with the standard deviation and the 
inter-quartile range of MTB (1.87 and 1.01, respectively from Table 1). This finding is 
similar to the result in Villalonga and Amit (2006) that family firms among the Fortune 
500 companies have higher valuations when the founder is the Chairman with a hired 
CEO. 
However, we find an insignificant coefficient on the founder-CEO variable, which 
differs from findings of Andersen and Reeb (2003) and Villalonga and Amit (2006), who 
document a positive relationship between the presence of founder-CEOs and firm 
valuation. We replicate the analyses in Andersen and Reeb (2003) using our sample and 
find a positive valuation effect of FCEO similar to the results in Andersen and Reeb 
(2003) after including the same control variables used in that paper. However, the 
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inclusion of a larger set of control variables in our analysis appears to reduce the FCEO 
coefficient to effectively zero (-0.04 with a t-statistic of -0.37 in Table 2). This result 
suggests a need to rethink the founder-CEO valuation premium documented in prior 
literature because a more comprehensive set of control variables explains away the 
positive relation between founder-CEOs and firm valuation.   
Notably, we find that the presence of a former CEO on the board is not 
statistically associated with firm valuation. The sum of the coefficients on PAST_CEO 
(0.02) and HI_PAST_CEO_HOLD (-0.09) is negative and significantly lower than the 
coefficient on FDIR (0.30). The difference is statistically significant (p-value=0.00). The 
effect of FDIR on Tobin's Q is greater than that of a past CEO with high equity stake on 
the board suggesting that the founder director effect is not merely due to the founder 
directors’ expertise and equity driven incentives to monitor but due to a combination of 
these factors and likely the founders’ intrinsic motivation due to non-pecuniary 
attachment to the firm.  
Finally, consistent with Villalonga and Amit (2006), we find that FAM_CEO is 
negatively related to firm value (coefficient = -0.40 and t-statistic = -2.53). This suggests 
a lower valuation for firms with a successor CEO from the founder’s family. This result 
is also consistent with the conclusions in Perez-Gonzalez (2006) on the value destroying 
effects of family-heirs as CEO. Our findings are also related to the evidence in 
Fahlenbrach (2009) and Adams et al. (2009). These papers do not distinguish between 
founder-director and founder-CEO firms and find results consistent with our unreported 
findings active founders (FDIR + FCEO) have a positive association with firm value. 
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 To understand some channels that might drive the positive association between 
founder-directors and firm value, we next examine CEO compensation, CEO turnover, 
and M&A decisions of founder-director firms to see whether and how these decisions 
differ compared to non-founder firms. 
 
3.2 Executive compensation in founder-director firms 
3.2.1 CEO pay for performance sensitivity 
A priori, it is not clear whether founder-director firms would provide lower or 
higher sensitivity of pay to performance than other firms. High-powered incentives are 
useful to motivate managers to take unobservable actions that maximize profits. Since 
founders have greater firm specific experience than the average director, they are better 
placed to observe and evaluate managerial actions rather than rely on outcomes. If so, 
PPS in founder-director firms may be less than in other firms. However, high-powered 
compensation contracts can also provide managers with incentives to falsify 
performance, especially if the chances of detection are low (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; 
Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006). Recent theoretical papers (Goldman and Slezak, 2006; 
Crocker and Slemrod, 2009) imply that boards will grant greater equity-based 
compensation when it is easier to prevent or detect such manipulation. If founder-
directors provide better monitoring, PPS will be higher for CEOs in founder-director 
firms than for CEOs in non-founder firms.7
                                                 
7 Some preliminary evidence suggests that CEO pay is different in family firms. Andersen and Reeb (2003) 
present summary statistics that indicate that CEOs in family firms (including family and non-family CEOs) 
earn nearly 10% less of their total pay in equity based pay compared to CEOs in non family firms. For 
comprehensive reviews of the literature related to CEO PPS, please see Murphy (1999) and Frydman and 
Jenter (2010).  
  
 14 
We examine pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS) using the following empirical 
specification: 
TCOMPjt  =  β0 +  β1FDIRjt + β2DMKTVALjt + β3DMKTVALjt*FDIRjt + β4DMKTVALjt* 
Control Variablesjt + industry dummiesj + year dummiest +  errorjt.       (2) 
 In equation (2) above, β2 is the pay-for-performance sensitivity i.e., the change in 
the CEO’s firm-related wealth (TCOMP) for a unit change in firm value (Jensen and 
Murphy, 1990; Hall and Leibman, 1998).   
As in the previous test, we include a number of variables to control for possible 
differences between founder-director and other firms. In particular, we include variables 
that prior research has found to influence PPS such as CEO age (Gibbons and Murphy, 
1992), firm size (Baker and Hall, 2000; Core and Guay, 2001), and the variance in 
shareholder dollar returns (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999a). Prior papers (Hall and 
Leibman, 1998; Aggarwal and Samwick; 1999a and 1999b; among others) caution that 
PPS estimation will be influenced by outliers since some CEOs own large portions of the 
firm’s stock (for example Bill Gates of Microsoft). Following these studies, we estimate 
equation (2) using the median regression technique. The median is less influenced by 
large outliers and is a more robust estimate of central tendency than the mean. In 
untabulated sensitivity tests, we re-estimate the regression using OLS (after winsorizing 
at the 1% and 99% level) and using the robust regression procedure described in Hall and 
Leibman (1998). These robustness checks yield inferences similar to those reported based 
on median regressions. 
Table 3 reports the estimation of equation (2). All the coefficients in the 
regression are multiplied by 1,000 for ease of interpretation. The coefficient on 
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DMKTVAL (the change in the market value of equity) represents the change in CEO 
wealth for a $1,000 change in the market value of the firm. The estimates in Table 3 
show that firms with a founder-director have a higher PPS, as indicated by the positive 
and statistically significant coefficient on FDIR * DMKTVAL. The coefficient shows that 
the CEOs in firms with a founder-director have an additional change in wealth of $2.24 
for a change in shareholder wealth of $1,000.  To provide a benchmark for the economic 
significance of the results, we find that the average PPS for CEOs of non-founder firms in 
our sample is 5.20, i.e., the CEOs annual total compensation increases (decreases) by 
about $5.20 for a $1,000 increase (decrease) in the market value of the firm. Therefore, 
the $2.24 incremental difference for founder-director firms is economically significant. 
Both founder-CEOs (FCEO) and founder descendant CEOs (FAM_CEO) have 
higher PPS than CEOs in non-founder firms. The coefficient on FCEO * DMKTVAL is 
3.47 and that on FAM_CEO * DMKTVAL is 5.44 and both are statistically significant. 
This is likely the result of a founder-CEO and descendant-CEOs having greater equity 
holdings in a firm than the average CEO.8
We control for a number of mechanisms that can substitute for a founder-director. 
Notably, the FDIR effect is markedly different from that of having a past CEO with 
significant shareholdings on the board. The coefficient on FDIR * DMKTVAL (2.24) is 
larger than the sum of those on PAST_CEO * DMKTVAL (-0.20) and 
HI_PAST_CEO_HOLD * DMKTVAL (0.12) and the difference is statistically significant 
(p-value <0.01). This result shows that having a former CEO with high equity stake on 
   
                                                 
8 In the main specifications we control for CEO_OWN, measured as the proportion of the firm's equity held 
by the CEO to make this estimation consistent with all the other tables. However, since CEO_OWN can be 
mechanically correlated with PPS, we also estimate the same equation without CEO_OWN. There is no 
change in the inferences when CEO_OWN is removed. 
 16 
the board is not associated with a similar increase in PPS for the current CEO as having a 
founder as a director.  We also control for the extent of director shareholdings 
(DIR_HOLD) in the company and the presence of an independent director block holder 
(IND_DIR_BLK). The impact of the founder-director is incremental to the impact of 
equity holding by the board of directors and the presence of a block holder on the board.9
                                                 
9 Among the control variables, we note that the coefficient on stock return volatility is positive and 
significant suggesting higher PPS in companies with greater return volatility. This result differs from 
findings in papers such as Aggarwal and Samwick (1999), Jin (2002) and Garvey and Milbourn (2003) who 
find a negative relationship between uncertainty and PPS. However, the Prendergast (2002) survey 
concludes that the evidence is mixed and shows that a principal's objective of providing incentives to the 
agent to use superior local information leads to the prediction that incentive strength can increase with risk. 
Core and Guay (1999), Oyer and Shaefer (2001) and Core and Guay (2002b) evidence is consistent with 
such prediction. 
 
  
 
3.2.2 Level of CEO pay 
Next, we examine the relationship between the level of CEO pay and founder 
status of the firm using the following empirical specification: 
Log (ACOMP)jt  =  β0 +  β1FDIRjt + β2 Control Variablesjt +  industry dummiesj + year 
dummiest +  errorjt.       (3) 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of annual compensation (ACOMP), the 
amount of total cash compensation plus the fair value of stocks and options granted to the 
CEO in a fiscal year. This is measured using the variable TDC1 in the ExecuComp 
database. We control for the economic determinants of pay following Core et al. (1999). 
After controlling for the economic determinants of pay, a negative coefficient on FDIR is 
interpreted as lower excess CEO compensation in founder-director firms. As in the 
previous tests, we include a number of variables to control for the differences between 
founder-director and other firms.   
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The results in Table 4 indicate that CEOs in founder-director firms receive lower 
annual compensation than CEOs in non-founder firms as indicated by the negative and 
significant coefficient on FDIR (coefficient = -0.07, t-statistic = -2.98). In terms of 
economic magnitude, for a representative firm with CEO compensation held at the mean 
level of our sample, switching from a non-founder firm to a founder-director firm implies 
a reduction in CEO annual pay of about $329,000. Note that the mean level of annual 
compensation (ACOMP) for all firms in our sample is about $4.7 million. The economic 
magnitude of the coefficient on FDIR (-0.07) is smaller than that for former CEO 
directors with high equity stakes (captured by the sum of coefficients on PAST_CEO (-
0.07) and HI_PAST_CEO_HOLD (-0.07)) and the difference is weakly statistically 
significant (p-value = 0.10). This suggests that the downward pressure on compensation 
is even stronger in firms that have a past CEO with high equity stake on the board.10
We expect boards with founders to make more timely CEO replacement decisions 
when faced with deteriorating firm performance since founder-directors have a greater 
  
Overall, we find that there is a significant statistical and economic association 
between CEO PPS and the level of CEO pay and the presence of the founder on the 
board. CEOs in founder-director firms receive compensation that is more sensitive to 
firm performance and their excess pay (measured as the deviation from the level 
determined by economic determinants) is lower. 
 
3.3 CEO turnover performance sensitivity 
                                                 
10 One conjecture about this result is that when former CEOs are on the board, the current CEO tends to 
have weaker bargaining power and hence lower pay (Evans et al., 2010) We attempt to control for this 
effect by including variables for the age and tenure of the CEO but we cannot rule out this explanation.  
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ability and willingness to monitor senior management. We examine CEO turnover – 
performance sensitivity using the following logit regression: 
PROB(TNVjt) = β0 + β1*RETjt+ β2*ROAjt+ β3*FDIRjt + β4*RETjt*FDIRjt +   
  β5*ROAjt*FDIRjt + γ * Control Variablesjt + industry dummiesj +  
  year dummiest.                    (4) 
TNV is a dummy variable that equals one if there is a forced CEO turnover in a given 
year. RET is the industry-adjusted stock returns in the twelve months preceding the 
turnover date for companies with CEO turnover and ROA is the return on assets 
calculated as the current year ROA if the turnover occurs between July and December; it 
is calculated as the previous fiscal year ROA if the turnover happens between January 
and June following the timing convention in Parrino (1997).11
Table 5 presents the marginal effects and Z-statistics calculated following Norton, 
Wang, and Ai (2004) of the logit regression in equation (3). We include ROA and its 
interactions with the other variables in the regressions, but do not report them in the 
tables to keep the presentation manageable. The marginal effect of FDIR * RET is 
negative and significant (-0.057 with a t-statistic of -2.67) showing that CEOs of firms 
with poor performance are more likely to be replaced when founders are on the board.  
 Industry adjustment is 
done at the two-digit SIC level. We control for the same factors discussed earlier. We 
include controls for several board characteristics, because prior studies find that the 
turnover performance sensitivity increases when there are more outsiders on the board 
(Weisbach, 1988) and decreases with greater presence of busy directors on the board 
(Fich and Shivdasani, 2006) and with larger board size (Faleye 2003).  
                                                 
11 A large body of prior research provides evidence that CEO turnover is inversely related to firm 
performance (e.g., Weisbach, 1988; Fee and Hadlock, 2003). See Brickley  (2003) for a concise review.  
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Unreported results show that the interaction of ROA with FDIR is not significant. The 
marginal effect of FCEO * RET is negative but statistically insignificant.  
To gauge the economic magnitude of the FDIR effect, we conduct the following 
calculation: when a firm’s industry-adjusted return shifts from the 95th percentile (0.80) 
to the 5th percentile (-0.65), a change of 1.45, the increase in the probability of a forced 
CEO turnover is higher by 8.3% (calculated as -5.75% * 1.45, where -5.75% is the 
marginal effect of FDIR * RET) if the founder is on the board compared with a non-
founder firm. This magnitude is economically substantial, as the average forced CEO 
turnover rate in our sample is 3.1%. The marginal effect of FDIR*RET (-0.057) is 
significantly lower than the effect for non-founder former CEOs with large equity stakes 
captured by the sum of the coefficients on PAST_CEO*RET (-0.001) and 
HI_PAST_CEO_HOLD*RET (-0.001). This shows that boards with a founder-director 
are more likely to replace a CEO for poor performance than those with a non-founder 
past CEO with a high equity stake.  
 
3.4 Merger and acquisition returns 
Next, we examine if founder-director firms make better M&A decisions. The 
board of directors advise CEOs on M&As and evaluate their strategic decisions (Jensen, 
1993). Grinstein and Tolkowsky (2004) find that many boards have explicit committees 
to review M&A transactions.  If the presence of a founder-director on the board implies 
better monitoring of the M&A process, it would be associated with more efficient M&A 
decisions and therefore higher announcement returns.   
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Our sample firms completed a total of 3,504 acquisitions at an average of 0.3 
transactions per year during the sample period; however, the median firm completes zero 
M&A transactions. We examine the acquirer market reaction to the acquisition 
announcement using the following specification: 
ARETjt = β0 + β1FDIRjt + γ Control Variablesjt + Industry dummiesj + Year 
dummiest +  errorjt.,      (5) 
where ARET is the three day (-1,1) announcement returns for the acquirer centered 
around the deal announcement date. As in earlier tests, we include the full set of variables 
to control for the difference between founder-director and other firms. In addition, we 
control for other determinants of announcement returns: PCT_CASH (the percentage of 
cash to the value of the acquisition); PCT_ACQ (the percentage of the target acquired); 
DEAL_SIZE (the size of the transaction); the size of the deal relative to the acquirer 
(REL_SIZE); and whether the deal is diversifying or not (DIV_MERGER) following prior 
studies (Asquith et al., 1983; Fuller et al., 2002; Betton et al., 2008). The data 
requirement for all the control variables leads to a final sample of 1,734 acquisitions 
completed by our sample firms. 
The results in Table 6 show that acquirer returns during the announcement 
window for founder-CEO firms are 1.99% higher than that for non-founder firms (t-
statistic = 2.71) and the announcement returns for founder-director firms are 1.29% 
higher than for non-founder firms (t-statistic = 2.11). This suggests that founder-director 
firms, on average, make better merger and acquisition decisions than non-founder firms. 
Note that while the coefficient on FDIR (1.29) is larger than the sum of those on 
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PAST_CEO (0.30) and HI_PAST_CEO_HOLD (-0.07) the difference is not statistically 
significant.   
Prior studies suggest that certain M&A deal characteristics (e.g., diversification) 
might suggest value-destroying mergers and managers’ empire building incentives (see 
Betton et al., 2008 for a comprehensive review). We therefore examine if the presence of 
a founder-director is associated with the following deal characteristics: the frequency of 
M&A deals, diversifying transactions, deal size, acquisition premium, and the percentage 
of cash used in the acquisition. In untabulated results, we find no significant coefficient 
on FDIR as a determinant of these deal characteristics (i.e., when the deal characteristics 
are the dependent variables and our complete set of control variables in Table 6 are 
included). This shows that while founder-director firms tend to make better acquisitions 
on average there are no observable differences in the deal characteristics of founder-
director firms compared to those of other firms.  
A caveat to using announcement returns to measure M&A efficiency is that this 
approach assumes that there is no systematic difference between founder-director and 
other firms in the extent of pre-announcement leakage of information about impending 
acquisitions.12
                                                 
12 More generally, the approach assumes that there is no difference in market's expectation of the 
probability and expected quality of M&A bids between founder-director and other firms. 
 In unreported tests, we examine whether this assumption is valid. The 
results indicate no systematic difference in the target company stock returns in the 60-day 
and 30-day run-up periods before the announcement, suggesting that founder-director 
firms are not less likely to leak the acquisitions to the market before the deals are 
announced. Therefore, we consider the announcement return a reasonable measure of 
M&A efficiency.  
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3.5 Board attendance in founder-director firms  
We have documented some important differences in CEO compensation, CEO 
turnover, and M&A outcomes between founder-director and non-founder firms. While 
the above three outcomes are the primary board decisions that we examine, we 
corroborate our findings using  an input measure of board diligence and monitoring effort 
– attendance at board meetings following Cai et al. (2009). We ask the question – is the 
presence of a founder on the board associated with a better attendance record at board 
meetings?  
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires that companies list in their proxy 
statement the names of directors who attended less than 75 percent of the board and 
committee meetings in the previous fiscal year. We merge the attendance data available 
in the IRRC directors' database with directors’ fee data available in ExecuComp. To our 
knowledge, Adams and Ferreira (2008) is the only large sample study on determinants of 
director attendance at board meetings. Using data between 1996 and 2003, they find that 
directors are less likely to have attendance problems at board meetings (i.e., fewer 
directors attend less than 75% of all board meetings) when board meeting fees are higher.  
We conduct the analysis at the firm-year level.13
                                                 
13 We also conduct the analysis at the individual director level in unreported tests – our inferences remain 
unchanged from those reported for the firm level tests. 
 Attendance problem at the 
director level is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a director attended fewer than 75% of 
the meetings during that year and is 0 otherwise. The dependent variable ATTENDANCE 
is the average attendance problem of all the non-founder directors. We measure 
attendance only for non-founder directors since founders may be more committed to 
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attending board meetings and we want to exclude this effect in the dependent variable. As 
in the earlier tests, we include the full set of variables to control for the differences 
between founder-director and other firms. In addition, following Adams and Ferreira 
(2008), we control for the following additional variables that are possible determinants of 
directors’ attendance: fees that directors receive for attending meetings (DIR_MTG_FEE); 
the average number of years the firm's directors have served on the board 
(DIR_TENURE); average number of director positions held by the firms directors in other 
firms (OTHERPOS);  average of non-founder director compensation excluding meeting 
fees (DIR_COMP) and the mean of the retirement status of non-founder directors 
(retirement status takes the value 1 if the non-founder director is classified as retired from 
primary executive responsibilities by the IRRC database) (RETIRED). Data requirements 
shrink our sample size to 3820 firm-years. 
Table 7 presents the results from the following firm-year level regressions: 
Attendancejt =  β0 + β1 FDIRjt + γ Control Variablesjt + Industry dummiesj + Year 
dummiest + errorjt.    (6) 
The results show that presence of a founder-director is associated with improved 
attendance—the coefficient on FDIR is -0.02 (t-statistic = -4.82) i.e., the attendance 
problem is lower in founder-director firms. Interestingly, we do not find a similar 
relationship for founder-CEO firms (coefficient on FCEO = 0.01; t-statistic = 1.51). The 
coefficient on FDIR (-0.02) is more negative than the sum of those on PAST_CEO (-0.00) 
and HI_PAST_CEO_HOLD (0.00) and the difference is statistically significant. This 
result indicates that directors have a better attendance record in founder-director 
companies than in those with a former CEO with high equity stake on the board.  
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The evidence of a positive association between the presence of a founder-director 
and the attendance frequency of other directors in the firm can be interpreted in two ways.  
First, it may be the case that the founders’ presence creates a better functioning board and 
encourages greater attendance. Alternately, founder directors may be better at picking 
more diligent directors to serve on the board.  
 
4 Sensitivity tests and additional analysis 
4. 1 Non-linear relationships 
We examine whether the results are sensitive to the functional form of our 
regression equations. We use log of market value as a proxy for firm size because of the 
inherent skewness in the distribution of firm size. We relax the log linear relationship for 
firm size in the PPS test and include untransformed market value as the measure of firm 
size. There is no difference in our inferences. We also experiment with other 
modifications to test for sensitivity to functional form. For instance, we included squared 
terms for some of the key independent variables - firm size and firm age. The results are 
invariant to this change.  
We also conduct matched sample tests for all the regressions in the paper. We 
identify firm age and firm size as two of the most critical variables that identify founder-
director firms. Younger and smaller firms are more likely to have founders still active in 
the firm. For every firm that has a founder-director, we find a matching firm without a 
founder-director or founder-CEO with the same firm age and the closest market value of 
equity. We find matches for 1,708 founder-director firms. Untabulated results based on 
the matched sample confirm the cross sectional results for PPS, level of pay, CEO 
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turnover, and attendance tests. The magnitude of the coefficients on FDIR and its 
interactions are comparable to those that we present in the main cross sectional tables. 
The coefficient estimate on FDIR is statistically significant only at one-sided level (two 
sided p-value = 0.18) in the M&A announcement return test even though the sign and 
magnitude are similar to that in Table 6 (coefficient = 1.12, t-stat = 1.35, p-value = 0.18). 
However, the power of the test is low with only 522 observations in the matched sample. 
 
4.2 Industry and year fixed effects interactions 
 While we control for industry and year dummies in all the regressions, it is 
possible that there are industry-year specific differences that are not correctly taken into 
account. To account for this, we include a full set of industry-year fixed effects, i.e., the 
interaction of industry and year fixed effects. Although this empirical specification is not 
used widely in the literature, it provides an extremely strong test of the hypotheses by 
exploring the variations within an industry in a given year. We are unable to implement 
this specification in the median regression in the PPS tests because the median regression 
does not converge in the presence of the large set of interaction terms. Instead we 
implement an OLS version of this regression. All results are robust to the inclusion of 
industry-year interaction dummies.  
 
4.3. Industry effects in CEO turnover  
 Our primary tests use industry-adjusted stock returns as the measure of firm 
performance.  Jenter and Kanaan (2008) suggest that industry performance might not be 
fully removed from CEO turnover decisions. We therefore include industry performance 
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and its interaction with FDIR as additional independent variables with same control 
variables as in the main tests in Table 5. Unreported results show that the main inferences 
on the interaction between FDIR and stock return performance (FDIR * RET) continue to 
be supported in this analysis. The interaction of FDIR with industry level returns is not 
statistically significant (p-value = 0.598).  
 
4.4 Percentage and dollar amount of the equity stake of founder-director 
The relatively large equity ownership of a founder-director may provide economic 
incentives to monitor management and the control rights to effectively conduct the 
monitoring. A director’s incentive to monitor should be determined by the dollar value of 
her equity holdings, while her control rights should be determined by her percentage 
stake in the firm. We assess whether the implications of founder director for corporate 
governance are due to their higher equity incentives or greater control rights. 
We calculate the percentage of equity ownership a founder-director has (FPCT) 
and the absolute dollar value of the holdings using the market value of the equity at the 
end of prior fiscal year (FDOLLAR). We then reexamine the compensation and CEO 
turnover decisions by including FDIR with log(FPCT) or log(FDOLLAR) in the 
regression. Unreported results indicate that after controlling for FDOLLAR or FPCT, 
FDIR is still associated with higher PPS, lower level of CEO pay, and more frequent 
CEO turnover when firm performance is poor. Both FDOLLAR and FPCT are 
statistically significant, but their effects are smaller compared with FDIR.14
                                                 
14 We do not include both FDIR and FPCT in the regression together to avoid serious multicollinearity 
problems since these two variables are highly correlated (Pearson correlation coefficient 0.93). 
 Overall, the 
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evidence suggests that founder-directors have implications for corporate governance 
through mechanisms beyond equity incentives and greater control rights. 
 
5. Conclusions  
We examine firm value and corporate governance outcomes relating to CEO 
compensation, CEO turnover, and mergers and acquisitions when the founder of a 
company serves as a director on its board with a non-founder successor as the CEO. We 
find that the presence of founder-directors is associated with higher firm value as 
measured by Tobin's Q. This confirms related results in prior literature on the positive 
association between the presence of founders in family firms and firm value.  
Our evidence suggests that firms with a founder-director tend to have higher CEO 
pay-performance sensitivity, lower excess compensation in the level of pay, and higher 
CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. This suggests greater alignment of CEO 
incentives with shareholders interests through high-powered incentives. We also find 
higher announcement returns for M&A transactions announced by founder-director firms 
compared to those of non-founder firms. We corroborate the findings of better board 
governance using board meeting attendance a measure of greater board effort. We 
document better attendance at board meetings by non-founder directors when firms have 
a founder on the board. These results are unique to the presence of founder-directors and 
are not observed when the board has a past CEO with a high equity stake. This indicates 
that the founder’s non-pecuniary attachment to the firm through emotional ties and 
reputational investment plays a role in board decisions beyond firm specific knowledge 
and equity holding that the past CEOs with high equity stakes also possess. 
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 The evidence collectively shows that the presence of founders on the board is 
associated with better board decisions, greater diligence, and effective monitoring on the 
part of corporate boards. To the extent that founder-director firms are better governed and 
experience fewer agency problems, these results suggest that other firms on average 
would provide more high powered incentives (both compensation and retention) and 
lower pay to their CEOs if agency costs were reduced through better governance.  
Finally, these results suggest a channel which can drive the observed association 
between the presence of founders and higher firm valuation. The evidence of better board 
decisions that we document makes it more likely that founders have a positive effect on 
firm value and less likely that the association with value documented in prior papers is 
driven by omitted factors. 
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Appendix: Variable Definitions  
Founder-related variables 
 
FDIR: a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has a founder on its board (but not as the 
CEO) and zero otherwise  
 
FCEO: a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has a founder as its current CEO and zero 
otherwise  
 
PAST_CEO: a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has a non-founder past-CEO on its 
board and zero otherwise  
 
FAM_CEO : a dummy variable that equals one if the current CEO is a member of the 
founder’s family identified if the CEO and founder have the same last name and zero 
otherwise. 
 
Dependent variables 
 
Tobins’ Q (Table 2): the market value of equity plus the book value of total liabilities 
divided by the book value of assets. This variable is also labeled as MTB for Market-to-
Book in Table 1. 
 
TCOMP (Table 3): the sum of (i) cash compensation (the sum of salary, bonus, and other 
annual cash payouts over the year); (ii) the Black–Scholes value of options granted and the 
market value of restricted stock granted during the year and other long-term incentive 
payouts; and (iii) the change over the year in the market value of equity and options held by 
the CEO at the start of the year expressed in millions of dollars. The sensitivity of option 
portfolio value to stock prices is calculated following Core and Guay (2002a).  
 
ACOMP (Table 4): the sum of (i) cash compensation (the sum of salary, bonus, and other 
annual cash payouts over the year); and (ii) the Black–Scholes value of options granted 
and the market value of restricted stock granted during the year and other long-term 
incentive payouts. 
 
TNV (Table 5): a dummy variable that equals 1 if there is forced CEO change in a given year 
and 0 otherwise.  
 
ARET (Table 6): M&A announcement percentage returns, in percentage, in the (-1,1) 
window around M&A deal announcement dates.  
 
Attendance (Table 7): the average attendance record of the non-founder directors. The 
attendance record of an individual director is a dummy variable that equals 1 in a given 
fiscal year if a director missed more than 25% of the board meetings, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Independent variables: Firm characteristics 
 
MVE: the market value of equity in $million.  
 
RND:  the amount of R&D expenditures divided by the amount of sales.  
 
LEV:  the book value of debt divided by the book value of assets.  
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FIRM_AGE : the number of years since a firm’s founding date.   
 
DIVERSIFY: a dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm has more than one segment 
reported and 0 otherwise. 
 
CAPX: the ratio of capital expenditure over the book value of assets. 
 
BETA: the beta estimated using the stock returns data from the past 60 months before the 
end of the fiscal year end date.  
 
ROA: return on assets, calculated as earnings divided by the book value of assets. 
 
RET: Stock returns net of the 2-digit SIC industry returns. 
 
STD_ROA: the standard deviation of return on assets, estimated using data from the past 
3 years. 
 
RET_VOL: the standard deviation of the monthly stock returns in the last 60 months.  
 
DMKTVAL : the change in the market value of equity over the year.  
 
Independent variables: Board characteristics and other governance variables 
 
DIR_HOLD : the average equity ownership of all the board members (in percent).  
 
BD_SIZE: the number of board members.  
 
BD_INDP : the ratio of independent board members.  
 
OPTINT : the amount of stock options granted divided by the total annual compensation 
(including cash salary, bonus, and stock options grant) of the CEO  
 
INST_HOLD : the institutional ownership of a firm’s equity.  
 
G_INDEX : the g-index as calculated in Gompers et al. (2003).  
 
HI_PASTCEO_HOLD: a dummy variable that equals 1 if a director who is a former CEO 
owns more than the median equity ownership of all the founder-directors in our sample, and 0 
otherwise 
 
DELAWARE: a dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm is incorporated in Delaware and 0 
otherwise. 
 
IND_DIR_BLK : a dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm has an independent director 
that is a block holder (i.e., owns more than 5% of the company’s stock) and 0 otherwise.  
 
Independent variables: CEO characteristics 
 
MEDIA_MENTIONS: the number of times that a firm’s CEO is mentioned in the press 
during the fiscal year as reported in the Factiva database. 
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CENTRALITY: the ratio of CEO pay to the sum of the pay of the top 5 executives 
 
OUTSIDE_BD: the number of board positions that a CEO holds in other companies in the 
IRRC database. 
 
CEO_OWN: the percentage of stock ownership in a company by its CEO 
 
TENURE: the number of years a CEO has been in that position  
 
CEO_AGE: the age of the CEO  
 
INSIDE_HIRE: a dummy variable that equals 1 if a CEO is promoted from inside the 
firm and 0 otherwise. Following Parrino (1997) new CEOs are classified as outsiders if 
they have been with the firm for one year or less when they are appointed as CEO. Others 
are classified as insiders. 
 
Additional variables used in the merger and acquisition tests 
 
PCT_CASH: the percentage of cash payment used in the M&A transaction. 
 
PCT_ACQ: the percentage of ownership of the target company that is acquired in the 
M&A transaction. 
 
DEAL_SIZE: the M&A deal value (in $ million). 
 
DIV_MERGER: a dummy variable that equals 1 if the target has a different 2-digit SIC 
industry code than the acquirer, and 0 otherwise. 
 
REL_SIZE: the value of the M&A transaction scaled by the market value of equity of the 
acquirer at the end of the prior fiscal year. 
 
Additional variables used in the director attendance tests 
 
DIR_MTG_FEE: the fee directors receive for attending board meetings. Average across 
 all non-founder directors. 
 
DIR_TENURE: the average across of non-founder directors of the number of years since 
the non-founder director has been a director in a firm. 
 
OTHERPOS: the average of the mean number of director positions a director takes in 
other firms in the IRRC database for all non-founder directors in a firm.  
 
DIR_COMP: the average total compensation for all the non-founder directors received 
for the board responsibilities. For each non-founder director, compensation is the sum of 
the cash annual retainer plus the value of annual share and option grants. Annual option 
grant value is calculated using Black-Scholes model and input parameters from the 
ExecuComp database. Annual share grants value equals the amount of stock granted 
times the price at the close of the fiscal year end.  
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RETIRED: the mean of the retirement status for all non founder directors on the board. A 
directors retirement status is a dummy variable that equals 1 if his/her primary title in the 
IRRC database contains the string “RETIRE” and 0 otherwise.  
 
STK_HOLD: the average stock holdings, in percentage, of the non-founder directors in 
the company.  
 
DIR_AGE: the average age of the non-founder directors. 
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Table 1 : Summary Statistics 
Panel A: Sample descriptive statistics 
Variable N.Obs Mean Std. Dev. p25 p50 p75 
FDIR 11686 0.12 0.33 - - - 
FCEO 11686 0.13 0.33 - - - 
PAST_CEO 11686 0.18 0.38 - - - 
FAM_CEO 11686 0.01 0.12 - - - 
MTB 11686 1.99 1.87 1.15 1.47 2.16 
TCOMP ($MM) 11681 15.64 74.55 0.00 4.03 15.55 
ACOMP($MM) 11681 4.70 6.29 1.2 2.5 5.3 
TNV (%) 11024 2.99 17.04 - - - 
ARET 3504 0.24 6.82 -2.77 0.14 3.24 
ATTENDANCE  11681 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.55 
MVE ($MM) 11686 6655.37 15747.10 604.44 1619.06 5073.92 
RND 11686 0.08 2.28 0.00 0.00 0.03 
LEV 11686 0.57 0.24 0.42 0.58 0.72 
FIRM_AGE 11577 56.45 40.87 22 45 86 
DIVERSIFY 11671 0.89 0.32 1.00 1.00 1.00 
CAPX 10884 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.08 
BETA 11333 0.97 0.67 0.51 0.86 1.28 
ROA 11681 0.09 0.11 0.04 0.09 0.13 
RET 11525 0.16 0.56 -0.14 0.11 0.36 
STD_ROA 11681 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.05 
RET_VOL 11175 0.42 0.19 0.28 0.37 0.51 
DIR_HOLD (%) 11681 9.60 16.88 0.00 2.50 10.73 
BD_SIZE 11686 9.65 2.98 7 9 11 
BD_INDP 11686 0.64 0.18 0.53 0.67 0.78 
OPTINT 11669 0.35 0.29 0.04 0.34 0.58 
INST_HOLD 10617 60.42 19.00 47.84 62.07 74.56 
G-INDEX 9760 9.27 2.68 7 9 11 
HI_PASTCEO_HOLD 11681 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 
DELAWARE 11671 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 
IND_DIR_BLK 11424 0.03 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 
MEDIA_MENTIONS 11023 29.51 288.52 1.00 6.00 19.00 
CENTRALITY 10958 0.37 0.13 0.30 0.37 0.44 
OUTSIDE_BD 11490 0.87 1.17 0.00 0.00 1.00 
CEO_OWN (%) 11189 2.57 6.29 0.09 0.32 1.45 
TENURE 10419 7.10 7.17 2.00 5.00 10.00 
CEO_AGE 11686 57.89 9.24 51.00 58.00 64.00 
INSIDE_HIRE 11120 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00 1.00 
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Panel B: Means of the variables by founder status  
Variable  Non-
founder 
firms  
Founder-
director 
firms  
Founder-
CEO firms  
P-value of  
diff. 
between (1) 
and (2)  
P-value of  
diff. 
between (1) 
and (3) 
P-value of  
diff. 
between (2) 
and (3) 
MTB 1.83 2.61 2.38 0.00 0.00 0.14 
TCOMP ($MM) 12.54 20.51 29.39 0.02 0.00 0.07 
ACOMP ($MM) 4.66 4.77 4.89 0.76 0.65 0.79 
TNV (%) 2.69 5.88 2.02 0.00 0.11 0.00 
ARET 0.12 0.19 0.81 0.01 0.01 0.07 
ATTENDANCE  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.28 0.86 0.20 
MVE ($MM) 7059.81 6815.83 4107.15 0.84 0.00 0.03 
RND 0.04 0.11 0.29 0.00 0.21 0.36 
LEV 0.60 0.48 0.51 0.00 0.00 0.08 
FIRM_AGE 66.22 30.57 23.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 
DIVERSIFY 0.87 0.93 0.93 0.00 0.00 0.84 
CAPX 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.38 0.03 0.20 
BETA 0.88 1.23 1.24 0.00 0.00 0.92 
ROA 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.80 0.19 0.37 
RET 0.16 0.17 0.20 0.26 0.01 0.19 
STD_ROA 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.83 
RET_VOL 0.39 0.50 0.51 0.00 0.00 0.41 
DIR_HOLD (%) 7.71 15.30 15.37 0.00 0.00 0.98 
BD_SIZE 9.88 8.82 8.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 
BD_INDP 0.67 0.53 0.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 
OPTINT 0.34 0.40 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.67 
INST_HOLD 60.44 58.95 61.74 0.18 0.25 0.04 
G-INDEX 9.56 8.61 8.10 0.00 0.00 0.01 
HI_PASTCEO_HOLD 0.03 0.12 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
DELAWARE 0.54 0.59 0.62 0.14 0.02 0.50 
IND_DIR_BLK 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.86 0.07 0.16 
MEDIA_MENTIONS 22.99 52.50 46.61 0.21 0.42 0.56 
CENTRALITY 0.38 0.34 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.27 
OUTSIDE_BD 0.97 0.63 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.03 
CEO_OWN (%) 1.79 2.79 6.95 0.00 0.00 0.00 
TENURE 5.98 6.57 14.53 0.25 0.00 0.00 
CEO_AGE 57.22 60.40 56.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 
INSIDE_HIRE 0.65 0.62 1.00 0.30 0.00 0.00 
 
This table presents summary statistics. Panel A presents the summary statistics for all firm-years. 
Panel B presents the variable means by the firm’s founder status and p-values for differences in means 
between the various groups. All variables are as defined in the Appendix. P-values are based on 
standard errors clustered at the firm level. 
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Table 2  
Founder Directors and Firm Value 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Coefficient T-stat 
   
Founder variables   
FDIR 0.30*** (3.34) 
FCEO -0.04 (-0.37) 
PAST_CEO 0.02 (0.56) 
FAM_CEO -0.40** (-2.53) 
   
Firm characteristics   
LN(MVE) 0.36*** (15.00) 
RND 0.24** (2.23) 
LEV -0.40** (-2.15) 
FIRM_AGE -0.15*** (-4.08) 
DIVERSIFY 0.13** (2.04) 
CAPX 1.30** (2.46) 
BETA -0.01 (-0.19) 
ROA 5.69*** (9.75) 
RET 0.63*** (10.06) 
STD_ROA 8.58*** (7.43) 
RET_VOL 0.08 (0.34) 
DIR_HOLD 0.00 (1.19) 
Ln(BD_SIZE) -0.78*** (-6.47) 
BD_INDP -0.02 (-0.11) 
OPTINT 0.36*** (4.81) 
INST_HOLD -0.00*** (-3.06) 
G_INDEX 0.00 (0.42) 
HI_PASTCEO_HOLD -0.09 (-1.10) 
DELAWARE -0.14*** (-2.80) 
IND_DIR_BLK 0.01 (0.10) 
   
CEO characteristics   
MEDIA_MENTIONS -0.00 (-1.45) 
CENTRALITY -0.71*** (-4.49) 
OUTSIDE_BD -0.02 (-1.05) 
CEO_OWN 0.00 (0.78) 
TENURE 0.01** (2.28) 
CEO_AGE -0.01*** (-3.23) 
INSIDE_HIRE -0.03 (-0.66) 
   
Observations 6616  
R-squared 0.576  
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This table presents the regression of Tobin’s Q on founder-director dummy and other variables. 
The dependent variable is Tobins’ Q (MTB), calculated as the market value of equity plus the 
book value of total liability divided by the book value of assets. The independent variables are as 
defined in the Appendix. The regression includes industry and year fixed effects. T-statistics are 
clustered at firm level. *, **, *** implies two sided significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 3  
Founder Directors and CEO Pay for Performance Sensitivity 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Coefficient T-stat 
   
Founder variables   
DMKTVAL 20.73*** (67.74) 
FDIR 303.98* (1.76) 
FDIR * DMKTVAL 2.24*** (50.13) 
FCEO 588.65*** (2.94) 
FCEO * DMKTVAL 3.47*** (50.83) 
PAST_CEO -38.89 (-0.29) 
PAST_CEO * DMKTVAL -0.20*** (-5.92) 
FAM_CEO -1,559.55*** (-3.37) 
FAM_CEO * DMKTVAL 5.44*** (24.92) 
   
Firm characteristics   
Ln(MVE) 1,434.71*** (33.45) 
Ln(MVE) * DMKTVAL -1.01*** (-56.33) 
RND 67.00 (0.79) 
RND * DMKTVAL 0.12 (0.78) 
LEV 458.79* (1.71) 
LEV * DMKTVAL 1.84*** (23.19) 
Ln(FIRM_AGE) -31.98 (-0.38) 
Ln(FIRM_AGE) * DMKTVAL -0.08*** (-3.42) 
DIVERSIFY -154.79 (-0.76) 
DIVERSIFY * DMKTVAL -0.08* (-1.84) 
CAPX -2,025.50 (-1.63) 
CAPX * DMKTVAL -4.07*** (-12.11) 
BETA -197.82 (-1.56) 
BETA * DMKTVAL 0.05 (1.60) 
ROA 1,399.96** (2.35) 
ROA * DMKTVAL 1.43*** (7.38) 
STD_ROA 2,950.14** (2.01) 
STD_ROA * DMKTVAL -5.51*** (-10.39) 
RET_VOL 2,231.84*** (4.08) 
RET_VOL * DMKTVAL 5.53*** (36.59) 
DIR_HOLD 5.11 (1.29) 
DIR_HOLD * DMKTVAL 0.01*** (7.74) 
Ln(BD_SIZE) -256.20 (-1.06) 
Ln(BD_SIZE) * DMKTVAL -2.86*** (-42.64) 
BD_INDP -174.19 (-0.51) 
BD_INDP * DMKTVAL -5.40*** (-63.16) 
INST_HOLD -1.52 (-0.49) 
INST_HOLD * DMKTVAL 0.02*** (15.72) 
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G-INDEX 14.34 (0.71) 
G-INDEX * DMKTVAL 0.13*** (23.45) 
HI_PASTCEO_HOLD -406.27 (-1.57) 
HI_PASTCEO_HOLD * DMKTVAL 0.12*** (19.79) 
DELAWARE 3.85 (0.04) 
DELAWARE * DMKTVAL 0.67*** (26.67) 
IND_DIR_BLK -67.67 (-0.24) 
IND_DIR_BLK * DMKTVAL -0.99*** (-10.81) 
   
CEO characteristics   
MEDIA_MENTIONS 21.99*** (155.37) 
MEDIA_MENTIONS * DMKTVAL -0.00*** (-218.96) 
CENTRALITY 11,503.53*** (29.44) 
CENTRALITY * DMKTVAL 0.98*** (11.76) 
OUTSIDE_BD 14.47 (0.33) 
OUTSIDE_BD * DMKTVAL -0.09*** (-10.70) 
CEO_OWN 489.50*** (44.55) 
CEO_OWN * DMKTVAL 4.07*** (1,042.90) 
TENURE -8.57 (-1.06) 
TENURE * DMKTVAL 0.38*** (170.40) 
CEO_AGE -14.31** (-2.57) 
CEO_AGE * DMKTVAL -0.01*** (-5.95) 
INSIDE_HIRE -188.33* (-1.66) 
INSIDE_HIRE * DMKTVAL -1.75*** (-56.64) 
   
Observations 6623  
Pseudo-R2 0.4271  
 
This table presents the median regression of CEO total compensation on change in shareholder 
wealth, founder-director dummy, and other variables. The dependent variable is TCOMP, as 
defined in Notes to Table 1. DMKTVAL is the change in the market value of equity over the year. 
All independent variables are as defined in the Appendix. 
 
The regression includes 2-digit SIC industry and year fixed effects. T-statistics are clustered at 
firm level. The coefficients are 1000 times the regression coefficient. *, **, *** implies two sided 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
 43 
Table 4 
Founder Directors and Level of CEO Pay 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Coefficient T-stat 
   
Founder variables   
FDIR -0.07*** (-2.98) 
FCEO 0.01 (0.24) 
PAST_CEO -0.07*** (-3.80) 
FAM_CEO -0.16*** (-2.58) 
   
Firm characteristics   
LN(MVE) 0.38*** (67.30) 
RND 0.01 (1.38) 
LEV 0.47*** (13.53) 
FIRM_AGE 0.02** (2.15) 
DIVERSIFY -0.03 (-1.27) 
CAPX -0.65*** (-4.05) 
BETA -0.10*** (-6.09) 
ROA 0.07 (0.88) 
RET -0.04*** (-2.89) 
STD_ROA 0.01 (0.06) 
RET_VOL 1.02*** (14.27) 
DIR_HOLD 0.00 (0.89) 
Ln(BD_SIZE) 0.21*** (6.79) 
BD_INDP -0.11** (-2.54) 
OPTINT 0.90*** (33.69) 
INST_HOLD 0.00*** (6.41) 
G_INDEX 0.01*** (4.01) 
HI_PASTCEO_HOLD -0.07** (-2.07) 
DELAWARE 0.08*** (5.76) 
IND_DIR_BLK -0.05 (-1.34) 
   
CEO characteristics   
MEDIA_MENTIONS 0.00 (0.48) 
CENTRALITY 3.17*** (58.98) 
OUTSIDE_BD 0.01** (2.05) 
CEO_OWN -0.01*** (-5.38) 
TENURE 0.00*** (4.05) 
CEO_AGE -0.00 (-1.35) 
INSIDE_HIRE -0.08*** (-5.37) 
   
Observations 6616  
R-squared 0.784  
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This table presents the regression of CEO annual flow compensation on founder-director dummy 
and other variables. The dependent variable is log of ACOMP, calculated as the sum of (i) cash 
compensation (the sum of salary, bonus, and other annual cash payouts over the year); and (ii) the 
Black–Scholes value of options granted and the market value of restricted stock granted during 
the year and other long-term incentive payouts. The independent variables are as defined in the 
Appendix. The regression includes industry and year fixed effects. T-statistics are clustered at 
firm level. *, **, *** implies two sided significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 5 
Founder Directors and CEO Turnover 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Marginal Effect Z-stat 
   
Founder variables   
RET -0.011 (-0.44) 
FDIR 0.003 (0.98) 
FDIR * RET -0.057*** (-2.70) 
FCEO -0.008** (-2.24) 
FCEO * RET -0.005 (-0.04) 
PAST_CEO -0.001 (-0.33) 
PAST_CEO * RET -0.001 (-0.18) 
FAM_CEO -0.009 (-0.41) 
FAM_CEO * RET 0.008 (0.27) 
   
Firm characteristics   
Ln(MVE) 0.001* (1.71) 
Ln(MVE) * RET -0.002 (-1.09) 
RND -0.018 (-1.45) 
RND * RET -0.001 (-0.21) 
LEV 0.001 (0.25) 
LEV * RET 0.001 (0.12) 
Ln(FIRM_AGE) 0.002 (1.16) 
Ln(FIRM_AGE) * RET 0.004 (1.34) 
DIVERSIFY 0.000 (0.06) 
DIVERSIFY * RET -0.001 (-0.06) 
CAPX 0.029 (1.24) 
CAPX * RET -0.011 (-0.31) 
BETA -0.003 (-1.60) 
BETA * RET 0.001 (0.27) 
STD_ROA 0.043** (2.06) 
STD_ROA * RET 0.087** (2.50) 
RET_VOL 0.018** (2.04) 
RET_VOL * RET -0.015 (-1.04) 
DIR_HOLD 0.000* (-1.75) 
DIR_HOLD * RET -0.001*** (-3.19) 
BD_SIZE 0.002 (0.51) 
BD_SIZE * RET 0.003 (0.47) 
BD_INDP -0.004 (-0.60) 
BD_INDP * RET -0.029*** (-2.98) 
OPTINT 0.001 (0.30) 
OPTINT * RET 0.020*** (2.73) 
INST_HOLD 0.000 (-0.20) 
INST_HOLD * RET 0.000 (-1.39) 
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G_INDEX 0.000 (0.32) 
G_INDEX * RET 0.001 (1.19) 
HI_PASTCEO_HOLD 0.017** (2.20) 
HI_PAST_CEO_HOLD * RET 0.000 (-0.04) 
DELAWARE 0.001 (0.25) 
DELAWARE * RET 0.004 (1.14) 
IND_DIR_BLK 0.005 (0.66) 
IND_DIR_BLK * RET 0.014 (1.20) 
   
CEO characteristics   
MEDIA_MENTIONS 0.000 (0.20) 
MEDIA_MENTIONS * RET 0.000 (-0.61) 
CENTRALITY -0.043*** (-5.43) 
CENTRALITY * RET -0.044*** (-2.92) 
OUTSIDE_BD -0.001 (-1.56) 
OUTSIDE_BD * RET -0.001 (-0.39) 
CEO_OWN -0.002** (-2.50) 
CEO_OWN * RET 0.001 (1.22) 
TENURE 0.000 (0.22) 
TENURE * RET 0.000 (0.69) 
CEO_AGE 0.000 (0.16) 
CEO_AGE * RET 0.000 (1.21) 
INSIDE_HIRE 0.002 (0.81) 
INSIDE_HIRE * RET 0.002 (0.62) 
   
Observations 5968  
Pseudo-R2 0.2282  
 
This table presents the logit regression of CEO turnover on founder-status and other explanatory 
variables. The dependent variable is TNV, as defined in Notes to Table 1.  RET is the 2-digit SIC 
industry-adjusted returns measured cumulatively for the 12 month preceding the turnover event. 
ROA is the return on assets the current year. ROA is the measured for the current year if the 
turnover occurs in the second six-month period of the fiscal year; it is calculated as the previous 
fiscal year ROA if the turnover happens in the first six-month period of the fiscal year following 
Parrino (1997).. All other variables are as defined in the Appendix. The regression includes 2-
digit SIC industry and year fixed effects. Robust Z-statistics in parentheses are clustered at firm 
level. *, **, *** implies two sided significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  The marginal 
effect and standard errors of the marginal effect for the interaction terms FDIR*RET and 
FCEO*RET are computed using the method in Ai and Norton (2003) and Norton, Wang and Ai 
(2005). 
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Table 6 
Founder Directors and M&A Announcement Returns 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Coefficient T-stat 
   
Founder variables   
FDIR 1.29** (2.11) 
FCEO 1.99*** (2.71) 
PAST_CEO 0.30 (0.69) 
FAM_CEO 2.13 (0.77) 
   
Transaction characteristics   
PCT_CASH 0.01*** (2.92) 
PCT_ACQ 0.01 (0.27) 
DEAL_SIZE -0.00*** (-3.26) 
DIV_MERGER -0.19 (-0.59) 
REL_SIZE -2.62** (-2.41) 
   
Firm characteristics   
LN(MVE) -0.32** (-2.37) 
RND -3.64 (-1.49) 
LEV 1.30 (1.25) 
FIRM_AGE 0.77*** (2.74) 
DIVERSIFY 0.89 (1.43) 
CAPX -2.93 (-0.64) 
BETA 0.43 (1.10) 
ROA 3.83* (1.74) 
RET 1.08*** (2.78) 
STD_ROA -12.04 (-1.58) 
RET_VOL 1.88 (0.92) 
DIR_HOLD -0.01 (-0.43) 
BD_SIZE -0.60 (-0.76) 
BD_INDP 1.24 (0.96) 
OPTINT -0.01 (-0.01) 
INST_HOLD -0.01 (-0.67) 
G_INDEX -0.08 (-1.45) 
HI_PASTCEO_HOLD -0.07 (-0.08) 
DELAWARE 0.20 (0.60) 
IND_DIR_BLK -0.92 (-1.26) 
   
CEO characteristics   
MEDIA_MENTIONS 0.00*** (4.25) 
CENTRALITY -0.58 (-0.50) 
OUTSIDE_BD 0.01 (0.05) 
CEO_OWN 0.01 (0.19) 
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TENURE -0.01 (-0.43) 
CEO_AGE -0.03* (-1.74) 
INSIDE_HIRE 0.04 (0.09) 
   
Observations 1734  
R-squared 0.110  
 
The dependent variable is ARET, the M&A announcement returns in the (-1,1) window around 
the announcement dates. All independent variables are as defined in the Appendix.  
 
The regression includes 2-digit SIC industry and year fixed effects. T-statistics are clustered at 
firm level.  *, **, *** implies two sided significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 7 
Director Attendance at Board Meetings 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Coefficient T-stat 
   
Founder variables   
FDIR -0.02*** (-4.82) 
FCEO 0.01 (1.51) 
PAST_CEO -0.00 (-0.99) 
FAM_CEO -0.01 (-1.21) 
   
Director characteristics   
DIR_MTG_FEE -0.00** (-1.98) 
DIR_TENURE -0.00 (-1.41) 
OTHERPOS 0.01** (2.13) 
DIR_COMP 0.00 (1.00) 
RETIRED 0.01 (1.06) 
STK_HOLD 0.00 (0.13) 
DIR_AGE -0.00* (-1.84) 
   
Firm characteristics   
LN(MVE) -0.00*** (-3.38) 
RND 0.00 (0.36) 
LEV -0.00 (-0.36) 
FIRM_AGE 0.00 (0.54) 
DIVERSIFY 0.01** (2.36) 
CAPX -0.00 (-0.14) 
BETA 0.00 (0.76) 
ROA 0.03* (1.84) 
RET 0.00 (0.58) 
STD_ROA 0.07 (1.63) 
RET_VOL -0.01 (-0.81) 
DIR_HOLD 0.00 (0.17) 
BD_SIZE 0.02*** (4.45) 
BD_INDP -0.01 (-1.12) 
OPTINT 0.01** (2.32) 
INST_HOLD -0.00 (-0.86) 
G_INDEX -0.00 (-1.36) 
HI_PASTCEO_HOLD 0.00 (0.67) 
DELAWARE -0.00 (-0.14) 
IND_DIR_BLK 0.00 (0.14) 
   
CEO characteristics   
MEDIA_MENTIONS 0.00*** (2.73) 
CENTRALITY -0.01 (-1.06) 
 50 
OUTSIDE_BD 0.00 (0.18) 
CEO_OWN -0.00 (-1.63) 
TENURE 0.00 (0.18) 
CEO_AGE 0.00*** (2.80) 
INSIDE_HIRE -0.00* (-1.82) 
   
Observations 3820  
R-squared 0.066  
 
This table shows the regression of director attendance on founder status and other explanatory 
variables. The dependent variable is Attendance (the average of the non-founder director’s 
attendance problem in a firm. An individual directors attendance is coded as a dummy variable 
that equals 1 in a given fiscal year if a director missed more than 25% of the board meetings, and 
0 otherwise). All independent variables are as defined in the Appendix.  
 
The regression includes 2-digit SIC industry and year fixed effects. T-statistics are clustered at 
firm level.  *, **, *** implies two sided significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
  
 
